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Discrimination Claims
Renee M. Williamst
INTRODUCTION
Disabled veteran Melanie Starkman once served as a church
music director.' During the course of her employment, she suf-
fered from a range of medical conditions, including asthma, mi-
graines, osteoarthritis in her knees, and endometriosis. 2 Howev-
er, instead of agreeing to modify Starkman's work schedule so
that she could recover from knee surgery, the church fired her.3
When she filed a lawsuit alleging discrimination on the basis of
her disability, the district court denied her legal recourse.4 The
Fifth Circuit rejected her claim on appeal.5 Neither court exam-
ined the merits of Starkman's discrimination claim; instead, both
courts invoked the so-called "ministerial exception." The Fifth
Circuit held that, because Starkman performed a ministerial
role, judicial interference would infringe upon the free exercise of
religion.6
Starkman's case raises important questions concerning gov-
ernment power with respect to churches: to what extent can the
courts intervene in church affairs to enforce our nation's civil
rights laws? Can the government penalize a church for conduct
that would clearly run afoul of antidiscrimination laws in a secu-
lar workplace? Or would such a penalty violate the First
Amendment? At first glance, there appears to be an irresolvable
tension between the freedom of religion and the societal goal of
ending discrimination in employment. Here, the ministerial ex-
t BA 2006, Emory University; JD Candidate 2012, The University of Chicago Law
School.
1 Starkman v Evans, 18 F Supp 2d 630, 631 (ED La 1998), affd 198 F3d 173 (5th Cir
1999).
2 Starkman, 18 F Supp 2d at 631.
3 Id.
4 Id at 635.
5 Id at 177.
6 Starkman, 198 F3d at 176-77.
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ception-which essentially allows religious entities to discrimi-
nate against employees on the basis of religious affiliation and
other characteristics-achieves an uneasy compromise. As a
compromise, the ministerial exception has divided commenta-
tors, leading many of them to argue for a limited or substantially
narrowed ministerial exception,7 or, on the other hand, to argue
that the doctrine be more broadly applied to safeguard the free-
dom of religious employers.8 This Comment argues for a nar-
rowed ministerial exception in the context of disability discrimi-
nation claims. While much has been written about the ministeri-
al exception broadly applied,9 there appears to be a dearth of lit-
erature regarding the application of the ministerial exception to
block disability claims in the context of employment discrimina-
tion. However, courts reviewing claims brought under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA)' 0 have adopted the same ap-
proach as they have to employment discrimination claims
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII)11.12
Application of the ministerial exception to disability discrim-
ination claims has essentially provided religious organizations
carte blanche to discriminate against their employees, whose
only recourse for such claims is found within courts that are
overly deferential to the ministerial exception. This Comment
7 See, for example, Jessica R. Vartanian, Note, Confessions of the Church: Discrimi-
natory Practices by Relgious Employers and Justifications for a More Narrow Ministerial
Exception, 40 U Toledo L Rev 1049, 1064-69 (2009). See also Caroline Mala Corbin,
Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimina-
tion Law, 75 Fordham L Rev 1965, 1972 (2007) ("[To the extent the ministerial exception
has any constitutional basis, it would be a much more limited exemption than the one
currently applied.").
8 See Todd Cole, The Ministerial Exception: Resolving the Conflict Between Title VII
and the First Amendment, 4 Charleston L Rev 703, 737 (2010) (arguing that the defini-
tion of what constitutes a "minister" for the purposes of determining who should be sub-
ject to the ministerial exception should be expanded beyond only "members of the clergy"
to include "all employees of a religious organization" whose primary role is religious
teaching, participation in worship, or church administration).
9 See, for example, Corbin, 75 Fordham L Rev at 1965 (cited in note 7).
10 Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327 (1990), codified at 42 USC § 12101 et seq.
11 Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 253 (1964), codified as 42 USC § 2000e et seq.
12 See, for example, Starkman, 198 F3d at 175 (noting that "the 'ministerial excep-
tion' outlined in McClure [a case brought under Title VII] should be extended to the case
now before us because, like the ADA . .. , Title VII is an anti-discrimination and anti-
retaliation statute"). See also Laura L. Coon, Note, Employment Discrimination by Reli-
gious Institutions: Limiting the Sanctuary of the Constitutional Ministerial Exception to
Religion-Based Employment Decisions, 54 Vand L Rev 481, 515-16 (2001) (observing
that, "[d]espite the ministerial clause's origin in Title VII jurisprudence, the Starkman
court applied the exception to the plaintiff's ADA claim because of the similar anti-
discrimination purpose underlying both statutes").
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will utilize the courts' analysis of the ministerial exception gen-
erally to propose a solution to one area of the ministerial excep-
tion that is more likely to attract wider consensus: disability sta-
tus. Unlike other characteristics covered by antidiscrimination
statutes, such as gender, disability does not play an integral role
in church teachings or doctrine.
The caselaw and literature suggest that there is precedent
for such an approach. As other commentators have noted,
courts-despite the vitality of the ministerial exception among
the circuits-have hesitated to apply the exception to sexual
harassment claims.' 3 This has been interpreted as a signal that
courts are at least willing to entertain a more narrow application
of the ministerial exception. 14 As one commentator has observed,
"clergy sexual harassment claims are the one instance where
lower courts have declined to apply the ministerial exemption"
because "[i]mmunity from suits seems particularly inappropriate
on entanglement grounds in any case where no religious reason
is proffered" since an organization will likely not argue that its
religion necessitates sexual harassment.15 In this Comment, I
argue that discrimination against the disabled is equally unlike-
ly to stem from religious beliefs.
This Comment proposes that a narrowing of the ministerial
exception can be contemplated with respect to disability discrim-
ination claims. In the alternative, this Comment will argue that
disability claims brought under the ADA should be analyzed un-
der a different framework than other discrimination claims
brought under Title VII. Both proposed solutions attempt to rec-
oncile the competing interests of antidiscrimination and religious
freedom.
13 See Vartanian, Note, 40 U Toledo L Rev at 1064 (cited in note 7) ("[Clourts' will-
ingness to hear sexual-harassment suits may indicate a positive trend toward narrowing
the ministerial exception's application."). See also Corbin, 75 Fordham L Rev at 1977
(cited in note 7) (observing that "[a] handful of lower courts have permitted sexual har-
assment claims by clergy notwithstanding the ministerial exception," and that "[to date,
this remains the only exception to the broad sweep of the ministerial exemption").
14 See Vartanian, Note, 40 U Toledo L Rev at 1064 (cited in note 7).
15 Corbin, 75 Fordham L Rev at 2015 (cited in note 7).
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION DOCTRINE
AND ITS APPLICATION IN THE COURTS
A. The "Ministerial Exception" and Employment Discrimina-
tion Generally: The Doctrinal Underpinnings of Title VII
When drafting Title VII, Congress was cognizant of the po-
tential First Amendment problems in preventing religious organ-
izations from discriminating on the basis of religious affiliation,
and therefore made Title VII inapplicable to religious organiza-
tions "with respect to the employment of individuals of a particu-
lar religion."16 However, while allowing religious organizations to
discriminate on the basis of an employee's religious affiliation,
Title VII "did not relieve religious employers from liability for
employment discrimination in other protected categories."17 In-
stead, courts provided an additional liability shield by crafting a
"ministerial exception" doctrine. This doctrine stems from the
courts' concern that enforcement of antidiscrimination statutes
within churches could threaten religious freedom. The Ninth
Circuit observed that "[t]he Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses of the First Amendment compel [the ministerial] excep-
tion to the otherwise fully applicable commands of Title VII
when the disputed employment practices involve a church's free-
dom to choose its ministers or practice its beliefs." 8
Some commentators have also suggested that, aside from the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clause concerns, courts have
also found it necessary to protect the so-called right to "freedom
of expressive association."19 Suppression of expressive associa-
tion rights under the First Amendment can occur when the
"state meddles with the internal structure of an association, such
as by foisting an unwanted member upon the association."20 At
least one commentator argues that the relatively recent Supreme
Court decision of Boy Scouts of America v Dale2' further
strengthens this "associative expression" rationale, as the Dale
16 42 USC § 2000e-1(a) (emphasis added).
17 Janet S. Belcove-Shalin, Ministerial Exception and Title VII Claims: Case Law
Grid Analysis, 2 Nev L J 86, 87 (2002).
1s Bollard v California Province of the Society of Jesus, 196 F3d 940, 944 (9th Cir
1999).
19 See, for example, Corbin, 75 Fordham L Rev at 1981 (cited in note 7).
20 Id.
21 530 US 640, 643 (2000) (holding that requiring the Boy Scouts of America to allow
an openly gay assistant scoutmaster to rejoin its ranks violated the Scouts' "First
Amendment right of expressive association").
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analysis can be used to justify exclusion of certain individuals by
religious organizations.2 2 However, no court has upheld the min-
isterial exception explicitly on these grounds. 23
Given these First Amendment concerns, the courts have
found it necessary to widen the scope of Congress's ministerial
exception. Courts have permitted religious organizations to dis-
criminate on the basis of characteristics such as age and disabil-
ity status in addition to discriminating on the basis of religion, as
provided for by statute.24 In fact, courts have accepted the minis-
terial exception as a defense to a whole range of antidiscrimina-
tion statutes.25
1. Origins of the ministerial exception: The First Amend-
ment and McClure.
a) The First Amendment. The ministerial exception has
its basis in the First Amendment's guarantee of religious free-
dom. The First Amendment states, in part, "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof."26 Courts have offered both the Establish-
ment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause as justifications for
the ministerial exception. The Second Circuit has observed that
the Constitution requires the application of this exception to Ti-
tle VII, since "the presumptively appropriate remedy in a Title
VII action is reinstatement, but it would surely be unconstitu-
tional under the First Amendment to order the Catholic Church
to reinstate . . . a priest whose employment the Church had ter-
minated on account of his excommunication based on a violation
of core Catholic doctrine."2 7
22 Corbin, 75 Fordham L Rev at 2029 (cited in note 7).
23 Note, The Ministerial Exception to Title VIf The Case for a Deferential Primary
Duties Test, 121 Harv L Rev 1776, 1776 (2008).
24 See Corbin, 75 Fordham L Rev at 1975-76 (cited in note 7) (observing that the
ministerial exception "has been successfully asserted as a full defense to a range of anti-
discrimination and employee protection laws, including the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act,
Section 1981, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and a host of state antidiscrimination and
human rights statutes") (internal citations omitted).
25 See id.
26 US Const Amend I.
27 Rweyemamu v Cote, 520 F3d 198, 205 (2d Cir 2008), citing Brooks v Travelers
Insurance Co, 297 F3d 167, 170 (2d Cir 2002).
427
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b) Judicial expansion of the ministerial exception. Gen-
erally, courts cite McClure v Salvation Arm2 8 as the case precip-
itating the judicial expansion beyond the statutory allowance of
discrimination on the basis of religion. 29 McClure, an employee of
the Salvation Army, alleged that the Salvation Army had violat-
ed Title VII by compensating her with lower pay and fewer bene-
fits than her male colleagues. 30 Additionally, McClure claimed
that the Salvation Army fired her in retaliation for complaining
about this disparity.31 The Fifth Circuit held that the Salvation
Army, while a church,32 still fell within the definition of an "'em-
ployer' engaged in an 'industry affecting commerce'" for the pur-
poses of Title VII analysis.33 McClure noted that such
"[o]rganizations affecting commerce may not escape the coverage
of social legislation by showing that they were created for frater-
nal or religious purposes." 34 The Fifth Circuit even conceded that
the "language and legislative history of [Title VII] compel the
conclusion that Congress did not intend that a religious organi-
zation be exempted from liability for discriminating against its
employees on the basis of race, color, sex or national origin with
28 460 F2d 553 (5th Cir 1972).
29 See, for example, Cote, 520 F3d at 206 (stating that the Fifth Circuit in McClure
was the first circuit court to adopt formally the ministerial exception). See also Starkman,
198 F3d at 175 (noting that McClure first utilized the ministerial exception regarding
employment discrimination claims); Gellington v Christian Methodist Episcopal Church,
203 F3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir 2000); Elvig v Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F3d 951,
975 (9th Cir 2004).
30 McClure, 460 F2d at 555.
31 Id.
32 The question of whether the Salvation Army constituted a "church" for the purpos-
es of Title VII analysis posed an interesting question for the district court in McClure. As
the lower court noted, "[t]he Salvation Army has always been known as a charitable body,
but the question of its being a religion has rarely arisen." McClure v Salvation Army, 323
F Supp 1100, 1104 (ND Ga 1971). While acknowledging that "the question of what is a
religion as interpreted by the law has remained hazy throughout this country's exist-
ence," the lower court held that the Salvation Army is a "religion" despite its lack of "tra-
ditional houses of worship." Id. To justify its position, the court quoted language from the
Supreme Court of Georgia:
The term 'church' is one of very comprehensive signification, and imports an or-
ganization for religious purposes, for the public worship of God. . .. The Salva-
tion Army is a benevolent and religious institution. It is likewise a church on
wheels.... So it preaches the gospel. It disseminates Christian truth. It is a
church, a sect, and a religious institution.
Id at 1004-05, quoting Bennett v City ofLaGrange, 112 SE 482, 485 (Ga 1922).
33 McClure, 460 F2d at 557.
34 Id.
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respect to their compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment."35
But despite broadly construing Title VII to include churches,
the McClure court also recognized the central role that so-called
"ministers" play within a church:
The relationship between an organized church and its
ministers is its lifeblood. The minister is the chief instru-
ment by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose.
Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be
recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern. Just as the
initial function of selecting a minister is a matter of
church administration and government, so are the func-
tions which accompany such a selection. It is unavoidably
true that these include the determination of a minister's
salary, his place of assignment, and the duty he is to per-
form in the furtherance of the religious mission of the
church. 36
Given this view of the minister-church relationship, McClure
found that "Congress did not intend, through the nonspecific
wording of the applicable provisions of Title VII, to regulate the
employment relationship between church and minister."37 There-
fore, the Fifth Circuit found that subjecting the Salvation Army
to Title VII restrictions in these circumstances "would result in
an encroachment by the State into an area of religious freedom
which it is forbidden to enter by the principles of the free exer-
cise clause of the First Amendment."38
To justify its holding, the McClure court cited an earlier re-
luctance by the courts to interfere with church administration,
even when it had secular consequences. For example, McClure
noted that the Supreme Court had previously expressed the view
that
whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith or ecclesi-
astical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the
highest of these church judicatories to which the matter
has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such de-
35 Id at 558.
3 Id at 558-59.
3 McClure, 460 F2d at 560-61.
38 Id at 560.
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cisions as final, and as binding on them, in their applica-
tion to the case before them.3 9
McClure also cited the Supreme Court's reasoning in Gonza-
lez v Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila.40 The Gonzalez case,
which involved a controversy over an appointment to a church
position, resulted in the Court taking a decidedly hands-off ap-
proach with respect to involvement in ecclesiastical matters,
even when a plaintiff's civil rights were affected:
Because the appointment is a canonical act, it is the function
of the church authorities to determine what the essential
qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candidate
possesses them. In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrari-
ness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters
purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are ac-
cepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive,
because the parties in interest made them so by contract or
otherwise. 41
The McClure court noted that these cases, along with other
precedents, all contain "a spirit of freedom for religious organiza-
tions, an independence from secular control or manipulation, in
short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interfer-
ence, matters of church government as well as those of faith and
doctrine."42 It is on this doctrinal foundation that other circuits
have built the current framework regarding the ministerial ex-
ception. The difficult question for courts has been whether "a
particular employee is functionally a 'minister.'"43
B. Post-McClure Application of the Ministerial Exception
1. The Second Circuit: Ticali, Cote, and Redhead.
Before the formal adoption of the ministerial exception, low-
er courts within the Second Circuit acknowledged that there
were instances in which Title VII does not apply to the minister-
religious organization relationship, even when the discrimination
39 Id at 559, quoting Watson vJones, 80 US 679, 727 (1871).
40 See McClure, 460 F2d at 559, citing Gonzalez, 280 US 1 (1929).
41 Id at 16 (emphasis added).
42 McClure, 460 F2d at 560, quoting Kedroff v St Nicholas Cathedral, 344 US 94, 116
(1952).
43 Cote, 520 F3d at 208.
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is not based on religion. 4 4 However, the district court in Ticali v
Roman Catholic Diocese5 also acknowledged that Title VII bars
"discrimination on non-religious grounds by religious organiza-
tions toward their non-minister employees."46 The Ticali opinion
demonstrates the competing interests at play here-religious
freedom, on the one hand, and a respect for antidiscrimination
laws in the other. In a sense, the Ticali court split the difference.
The district court reasoned that "[t]he key inquiry for a court
seeking to apply Title VII to such an employment relationship is
whether the position involved has any religious significance." 4 7
Therefore, if the position contains "religious significance," then
the extension of Title VII into this employment relationship is
"constitutionally suspect, if not forbidden." 4 8 The court held that
a teacher of religious education at a parochial school was a posi-
tion with religious significance and therefore Title VII could not
be used to assert a claim of discrimination on religious grounds. 49
In adopting this stance, the court here arguably went beyond the
requirements of McClure, by stating that, "[d]espite the fact that
Ticali is a non-minister, her role as a teacher in the school may
be said to have religious significance, which deprives this Court
of jurisdiction over her Title VII claim to the extent that it alleg-
es religious discrimination."50 Despite expanding the class of em-
ployees against which the church could discriminate on the basis
of religion, the Ticali court reviewed her Title VII claims regard-
ing discrimination based on race and national origin.5 1 This oc-
curred before the formal adoption of the ministerial exception in
the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit itself confirmed the existence of the min-
isterial exception only recently in Rweyemamu v Cote,52 in which
the Circuit barred the examination of a priest's racial discrimi-
nation claim under Title VII.53 In Cote, the court went as far as
to affirm its "vitality" within the Circuit, as the exception is "con-
stitutionally required by various doctrinal underpinnings of the
44 Ticali v Roman Catholic Diocese, 41 F Supp 2d 249, 259 (EDNY 1999), affd, 201
F3d 432 (2d Cir 1999).
5 41 F Supp 2d 249.
46 Ticali, 41 F Supp at 259.
47 Id (emphasis added).
48 Id.
49 Id at 260.
5o Ticali, 41 F Supp at 260 (emphasis added).
51 Id at 260.
52 520 F3d 98 (2d Cir 2008).
53 Id at 209.
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First Amendment."54 Cote took the position that "[tihe more 'per-
vasively religious' the relationship between an employee and his
employer, the more salient the free exercise concern becomes."55
However, "[a]t the same time, however high in the church hier-
archy [an employee] may be, a plaintiff alleging particular
wrongs by the church that are wholly non-religious in character
is surely not forbidden his [or her] day in court."56 In essence, the
Second Circuit appears to adopt a sliding scale that examines
both the specific job description of the employee and the "nature
of the dispute."57 Despite this arguably more exhaustive inquiry,
the Circuit clearly stated that it would "not subject to examina-
tion the genuineness of a proffered religious reason for an em-
ployment action," even if the suit were brought by a lay employ-
ee.5 8 But the Second Circuit previously held that while the as-
serted religious values or beliefs would not be assessed for validi-
ty, courts could still inquire as to the reasons offered by churches
for instances of alleged discrimination.5 9
Building upon the Cote framework, a lower court found in
Redhead v Conference of Seventh-day AdventistsO that the min-
isterial exception will not apply if a plaintiff can demonstrate
that his or her duties were "primarily secular," and that the na-
ture of the dispute is not such that "its resolution inevitably will
run afoul of the Establishment Clause by impermissibly entan-
gling the court in matters of religious doctrine."61 Redhead con-
cluded that excessive government entanglement occurs when "a
secular court is asked to second-guess a religious organization's
decision to terminate a member of its clergy." 62 However, dis-
putes in which a court can make a decision "without having to
question the validity or plausibility of a religious belief, or having
to favor a certain interpretation of religious doctrine, do not pose
54 Id at 207.
55 Id at 208, citing Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Criti-
cal Evaluation of Discrimination by Rehgious Organizations, 79 Colum L Rev 1514, 1539
(1979).
56 Cote, 520 F3d at 208.
57 Id.
58 Id at 207.
59 See Demarco vHoly Cross High School, 4 F3d 166, 171 (2d Cir 1993) ("[A] plaintiff
will usually be able to challenge as pretextual the employer's justification without calling
into question the value or truthfulness of the religious doctrine.").
60 566 F Supp 2d 125 (EDNY 2008).
61 Id at 132.
62 Id at 133.
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a similar risk."63 While consistent with the sliding scale approach
adopted in Cote, this approach demonstrates that the Second
Circuit is willing to apply Title VII to a church when doing so
would not require a court to question the church's beliefs or val-
ues.
Applying the above test, the Redhead court allowed a former
teacher at a Seventh-day Adventist school to sue for wrongful
termination based upon her out-of-wedlock pregnancy, as the
court found that the teacher had a primarily secular function and
that allowing the claim would not entangle the government in
religious affairs.64 However, as the teacher's function was found
to be secular and not ministerial, Redhead's outcome does little
damage to the ministerial exception itself. Such a case does,
however, illustrate that the examination of personnel decisions
within religious organizations does not require an excessive in-
trusion into the ecclesiastical sphere.
2. The Ninth Circuit: Bollard, Elvig, and the application of
the doctrine to sexual harassment claims.
Like the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit applies a simi-
lar-though not identical-line of analysis to determine if allow-
ing a Title VII claim would impermissibly interfere with religious
freedom. In Bollard v California Province of the Society of Je-
sus, 65 the Ninth Circuit first addressed the contours of the minis-
terial exception doctrine in a sexual harassment claim brought
by a man training to be a priest against his Jesuit order. 66 The
Ninth Circuit noted that "courts have uniformly concluded that
[the religion clauses] of the First Amendment require a narrow-
ing construction of Title VII in order to insulate the relationship
between a religious organization and its ministers from constitu-
tionally impermissible interference by the government." 67
The Bollard court examined the claim by pursuing two lines
of analysis: a Free Exercise Clause rationale and an Establish-
ment Clause rationale. With regard to the Free Exercise Clause,
the court noted that certain religious interests are so strong that
no compelling state interest justifies government intrusion into
63 Id.
64 See id at 132.
65 196 F3d 940 (9th Cir 1999).
66 Id at 944.
67 Id at 945.
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the ecclesiastical sphere."68 The court recognized that "the minis-
terial relationship lies so close to the heart of the church that it
would offend the Free Exercise Clause simply to require the
church to articulate a religious justification for its personnel de-
cisions."69 Despite this recognition by the court, the Ninth Circuit
found that, because the priest alleged sexual harassment in Bol-
lard, any Free Exercise rationale for assertion of the ministerial
exception was missing.70 The court observed that the defendant
Jesuit order did not "offer a religious justification for the har-
assment Bollard allege[d]" and instead "condemn[ed] it as incon-
sistent with their values and beliefs."7' Since the sexual harass-
ment at issue lacked a religious doctrinal basis, the court con-
cluded that there was "no danger that, by allowing this suit to
proceed, [the court would] thrust the secular courts into the con-
stitutionally untenable position of passing judgment on questions
of religious faith or doctrine."72
The condemnation of sexual harassment by the Jesuits al-
layed the court's fears that applying Title VII would have a "sig-
nificant impact on their religious beliefs or doctrines."73 In short,
because the Jesuits averred that sexual harassment had no legit-
imate doctrinal basis in church teaching or doctrine, allowing the
sexual harassment inquiry to proceed would not detrimentally
impact the Jesuits' ability to exercise their faith freely. The court
emphasized that, aside from determining whether to intervene
and stop the harassment, there was no employment decision here
such that allowing an employment discrimination claim to pro-
ceed would interfere with a church's ability to select its own cler-
gy.7 4 Bollard explained that a "generalized and diffuse concern
for church autonomy, without more, does not exempt [churches]
from the operation of secular laws."75 Ultimately, the court found
that allowing the sexual harassment claim to go forward would
not violate the Free Exercise Clause protections afforded to reli-
gious organizations.7 6
68 Id at 946.
6 Bollard, 196 F3d at 946.
70 Id at 947.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Bollard, 196 F3d at 947.
74 Id.
75 Id at 948.
76 Id. See also Belcove-Shalin, 2 Nev L J at 104 (cited in note 17) (noting that, "[affter
carefully navigating through this constitutional minefield, the Bollard court felt satisfied
that granting jurisdiction to the plaintiff would not deprive the church of the protection
[ 2011:434
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Additionally, Bollard examined the claim by conducting an
Establishment Clause inquiry to determine if allowing a Title
VII claim to proceed "would foster an impermissible government
entanglement with religion."77 The court was most concerned
with a scenario in which the application of Title VII would result
in prolonged monitoring of church activities by the government.78
The Circuit concluded that, again, due to the nature of the law-
suit, any inquiry into the merits of the Title VII claim would not
necessarily result in "a wide-ranging intrusion into sensitive re-
ligious matters."79 Ultimately, Bollard concluded that allowing
the sexual harassment claim to proceed against the Jesuit order
would not result in an Establishment Clause violation, citing
both the "limited nature of the inquiry" as well as the "ability of
the district court to control discovery."80
Distinguishing Bollard, the Ninth Circuit more recently ap-
peared to take a different approach with respect to Title VII sex-
ual harassment claims by an ordained minister.81 In the 2004
case Elvig v Calvin Presbyterian Church,82 the Ninth Circuit
used the fact that Elvig was fired from his parish to distinguish
this scenario from Bollard, in which the plaintiff was not termi-
nated.83 Elvig's firing, the court reasoned, gave rise to claims
that "in certain respects very much involve the Church's deci-
sion-making about who shall be a minister of the Church-a de-
cision clearly within the scope of the ministerial exception." 84
While conceding that the sexual harassment claim itself would
have been a secular inquiry as in Bollard, Elvig held that "the
Church may nonetheless invoke First Amendment protection
from Title VII liability if it claims that her subjection to or the
Church's toleration of sexual harassment was doctrinal."85
The Ninth Circuit added that it will not "scrutinize doctrinal
justifications" since it is not the court's role to find whether the
plaintiffs mistreatment was for secular or religious reasons.86
afforded by the § 702 religious employer exemption").
7 Bollard, 196 F3d at 948.
78 Id.
7 Id at 950.
80 Id.
81 See Elvig v Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F3d 951, 958 (9th Cir 2004).
82 375 F3d 951.
8 Elvig, 375 F3d at 958.
84 Id.
85 Id at 959.
86 Id, quoting Alicea-Hernandez v Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F3d 698, 703 (7th
Cir 2003).
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Unlike the Second Circuit's willingness to at least inquire into
the reasons offered for a church employee's termination, the Ev-
ig court felt "proving that a church's asserted justification for a
protected employment decision was pretextual would come to
nothing" because of a church's sweeping discretion in its em-
ployment decisions.87 Interestingly, the court left the door open
for some of Elvig's sexual harassment claims for essentially two
reasons: (1) demonstrating that she was harassed in itself was a
secular inquiry; and (2) the church did not claim that sexual har-
assment had a religious justification.88
3. The Tenth and Seventh Circuits.
The Tenth Circuit has held that the ministerial exception
preserves a church's "'essential' right to choose the people who
will 'preach its values, teach its message, and interpret its doc-
trines[,] both to its own membership and to the world at large,'
free from the interference of civil employment laws."89 Whether
employees are governed by the ministerial exception depends
upon whether a given position is "'important to the spiritual and
pastoral mission of the church.'"90
The Tenth Circuit adopted the Fourth Circuit's view that Ti-
tle VII may apply to church employment decisions if they do not
implicate the church's "spiritual functions."91 This largely reflects
the Second and Ninth Circuit view that the inquiry into a claim
of employment discrimination cannot entangle the government
in the evaluation of an ecclesiastical doctrine's validity. However,
the Tenth Circuit has refused to adopt the Ninth Circuit's view
that "a hostile work environment claim brought by a minister
does not implicate a church's spiritual functions." 92 The Tenth
Circuit believes that allowing such claims to go forward would
infringe upon church autonomy by "influencing it to employ min-
isters that lower its exposure to liability" rather than the best
87 Elvig, 375 F3d at 961.
88 Id at 958-64.
89 Skrzypczak vRoman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir 2010)
(addition in original), quoting Bryce v Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado, 289
F3d 648, 656 (10th Cir 2002).
90 Skrzypczak, 611 F3d at 1243, quoting Rayburn v General Conference of Seventh-
Day Adventists, 772 F2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir 1985).
91 Skrzypczak, 611 F3d at 1245, citing Bryce, 289 F3d at 657.
92 Skrzypczak, 611 F3d at 1245 (distinguishing the Tenth Circuit's position from that
of Werft vDesert Southwest Annual Conference, 377 F3d 1099 (9th Cir 2004)).
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spiritually-suited people to fill the role. 93 In this sense, the Tenth
Circuit advocates a more broadly-applied ministerial exception.
Instead of employing the Ninth Circuit's test regarding the
application of the ministerial exception, the Tenth Circuit decid-
ed to follow the Seventh Circuit's approach. In Skrzypczak v Ro-
man Catholic Diocese of Tulsa,94 the Tenth Circuit endorsed the
position that "the ministerial exception applies without regard to
the type of claims being brought."95 The Seventh Circuit (and
subsequently the Tenth in its adoption of the Alicea-Hernandez v
Catholic Bishop of Chicago96 reasoning) felt that the inquiry pur-
sued by the Second and Ninth Circuits was too analytically
messy, as it would subject the courts to "endless inquiries as to
whether each discriminatory act was based in Church doctrine or
simply secular animus."97 Instead, the inquiry asks whether the
plaintiff is acting as a minister for Title VII purposes; if so, the
ministerial exception applies.98 The Tenth Circuit applies the
exception whether or not the alleged discrimination was related
to any sort of ecclesiastical decision. 99 While this approach has
the attractiveness of not entangling the court in parsing out reli-
gious motivations or doctrine, it also leaves ministers, however
defined, subject to conduct such as severe sexual harassment
akin to what was seen in Elvig.
One lower court in the Tenth Circuit adopted the Ninth Cir-
cuit's analysis. In Dolquist v Heartland Presbytery,00 the court
cited Bollard and Elvg in holding that the First Amendment
does not bar lawsuits for sexual harassment.10' In addition to
citing these cases, Dolquist noted that at least two state courts
have adopted similar logic regarding sexual harassment
claims. 102 In one of those cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court
allowed a sexual harassment claim to proceed because such a
claim would not offend the First Amendment, since "[o]bviously,
9 Skrzypczak, 611 F3d at 1245, quoting Elvig v Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397
F3d 790, 803-04 (9th Cir 2005) (order denying petition for rehearing) (Kleinfeld dissent-
ing).
94 611 F3d at 1238.
9 Id at 1245, quoting Alicea-Hernandez v Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F3d 698
(7th Cir 2003).
96 Alicea-Hernandez v Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F3d 698 (7th Cir 2003).
9 Skrzypczak, 611 F3d at 1245, quoting Alicea-Hernandez, 320 F3d at 703.
98 See Skraypczak, 611 F3d at 1245-46.
9 Id.
100 342 F Supp 2d 996 (D Kan 2004).
101 Id at 1007.
102 Id at 1006.
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sexual harassment is not doctrinally based, a protected choice, or
inherent in church administration."103 Dolquist reasoned that
issues involved within a sexual harassment case do not implicate
a religious organization's decision to "select clergy or decide mat-
ters of church government, faith and doctrine." 104
C. Disability Discrimination and the Ministerial Exception
1. The ADA's Ministerial Exception.
With this sense of how the general ministerial exception has
evolved in the courts, it is now appropriate to discuss how the
law has treated disability discrimination claims brought by min-
isterial employees. The ADA forbids any "covered entity" from
discriminating "against a qualified individual on the basis of dis-
ability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, ad-
vancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of em-
ployment."105 It prohibits employers from, among other things:
refusing to make reasonable accommodations for disabled em-
ployees, 106 denying employment to otherwise qualified employees
because of a disability, 07 utilizing "qualification standards, em-
ployment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend
to screen out" the disabled unless such standards are both job-
related and "consistent with business necessity."10 While there
is no explicit ministerial exception within the statute itself, the
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) attempts to describe the ap-
plication of the ADA to religious organizations. 109 Acknowledging
the ministerial exception generally, the CFR states that religious
organizations are not only permitted to prefer members of a giv-
en religion, but may also require employees to abide by the or-
ganization's religious tenets. 110 Despite this, the CFR clearly
prohibits discrimination "against a qualified individual, who sat-
isfies the permitted religious criteria, because of his or her disa-
103 McKelvey v Pierce, 800 A2d 840, 858 (NJ 2002) (discussing a claim under state
law, but noting the Bollard rationale).
104 Dolquist, 342 F Supp 2d at 1006, quoting Kedroff v Saint Nicholas Cathedral of
Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 US 94, 116 (1952).
105 42 USCA § 12112(a) et seq.
1oe 42 USCA § 12112(b)(5)(A) (noting an exception for "undue hardship" to the em-
ployer).
107 Id at § 12112(b)(5)(B).
108 Id at § 12112(b)(6).
109 See 29 CFR § 1630.16(a).
110 Id.
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bility.""n However, what constitutes the "permitted religious cri-
teria" is the real question, and, by extension, whether religious
organizations can discriminate on the basis of disabilities unre-
lated to job performance.
2. Application of Title VII doctrine to bar ADA claims.
A good place to begin examining how the courts have han-
dled disability claims is Starknan v Evans,112 the case described
in the Introduction. While the district court observed that allow-
ing for litigation on the merits would not violate the Establish-
ment Clause, it found that the Free Exercise Clause nevertheless
barred Starkman's claim. 113 As noted earlier, the analysis here
mirrors that found within Title VII ministerial exception cases,
as the court relied heavily upon cases such as McClure, EEOC v
Southwestern Baptist,114 and EEOC vMississippi College.115 The
court found that Starkman, as a choir director: (1) held a position
in which employment decisions were based substantially on reli-
gious criteria, (2) engaged in religious and spiritual ritual as part
of her job, and (3) participated in activities that are traditionally
religious in nature.116 Therefore, the court held, her employment
fell squarely within the Fifth Circuit's ministerial exception first
articulated in McClure, even though she brought her employ-
ment claim under the ADA, not Title VII.117 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed, noting that, "[w]hile religious institutions are
generally bound by the ADA and other employment discrimina-
tion laws, (e.g. a church secretary or janitor may advance an
ADA claim if he or she is discharged because of a disability), the
facts of this case trigger the Free Exercise Clause's bar against
such claims" because of Starkman's "minister" status.118
111 Id.
112 Starkman, 18 F Supp 2d at 631.
113 Id at 632.
114 651 F2d 277, 286-87 (5th Cir 1981) (holding that "an exemption for the Seminary's
support staff and other non-ministers is not constitutionally compelled" partially because
the Seminary "does not hold any religious tenet that requires discrimination on the basis
of sex, race, color, or national origin").
115 626 F2d 477, 488 (5th Cir 1980) (holding that ministerial exception to Title VII did
not prevent a psychology professor from bringing a sex discrimination claim against a
religiously-affiliated college because the college's employment practices did not "embody
religious beliefs or practices").
116 Starkman, 18 F Supp 2d at 633-35.
117 Id at 335.
118 Starkman vEvans, 198 F3d 173, 177 (5th Cir 1999).
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Other courts have also used the Free Exercise Clause to bar
claims under the ADA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that a resident
in a Methodist-affiliated clinical pastoral education program (es-
sentially, a program training residents to minister to the sick)
could not bring a claim under the ADA for dismissal based upon
the results of a psychiatric evaluation administered to the resi-
dent.1 19
Additionally, and perhaps most importantly for the purposes
of this Comment, the Ninth Circuit held in Wert v Desert
Southwest Annual Conference1 20 that the ministerial exception
does not apply solely to hiring or firing decisions, but also to any
matters related to a minister's relationship with the church such
as whether the church is willing to provide a reasonable accom-
modation.121 Werft involved a pastor who suffered from attention
deficit disorder, dyslexia, and "certain heart problems" who
sought "minor accommodations" in order to perform his duties. 122
Instead, the church refused his requests and demanded the pas-
tor's resignation. 123 The Werft court distinguished that case from
Bollard by stating that the sexual harassment seen in Bollard
was not part of the minister's relationship with the church,
whereas the failure to accommodate a disability was a decision
regarding the minister's employment relationship with the
church. 124 The disability claim in WerA, the Ninth Circuit rea-
soned, was "more similar to the pre-Bollard Title VII cases,
where claims were disallowed because they would require a civil
court to inquire into religious justifications for personnel deci-
sions, than the Title VII sexual harassment claim at issue in Bol-
lard."125 Therefore, the court concluded that, if this lawsuit were
allowed to move forward, the Church "would necessarily be re-
quired to provide a religious justification for its failure to ac-
commodate," which is impermissible under the First Amend-
ment.126
119 Hollins v Methodist Healthcare, 474 F3d 223, 224-27 (6th Cir 2007).
120 377 F3d 1099 (9th Cir 2004).
121 Id at 1103.
122 Id at 1100.
123 Id.
124 Werft, 377 F3d at 1103.
125 Id at 1101-02.
126 Id at 1103.
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3. Examples of the ministerial exception failing to bar ADA
claims.
Despite the seemingly broad expanse of the ministerial ex-
ception with respect to disability claims-particularly given the
approach adopted by the Werft court-there are cases in which
courts have refused to recognize the exception as a bar to ADA
litigation. However, these cases have been decided on the
grounds that the role undertaken by the employee does not fall
within the definition of "minister." For example, one federal dis-
trict court has found that a theology teacher at a Jesuit high
school could pursue an ADA claim against his employer after he
was dismissed for reasons relating to his performance as a teach-
er generally, which is distinct from the theological material he
taught. 12 7 In Longo v Regis Jesuit Higl, 128 John Longo, therefore,
did not meet the definition of a "minister" under those circum-
stances. 129 The Sixth Circuit, in EEOC v Hosanna-Tarbor Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church and School,130 citing Redhead, also held
that parochial school teachers who teach primarily secular sub-
jects are not "ministers" for the purposes of the exception. 131 Giv-
en the uncertainty surrounding the definition of what constitutes
a "minister" for purposes of Title VII analysis, these holdings
offer insufficient protection for disabled church employees.
II. Two METHODS FOR ANALYZING DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
CLAIMS WITHIN A MINESTERIAL EXCEPTION CONTEXT
This Comment argues that the courts' current application of
the ministerial exception with respect to claims made under the
ADA exceed what is necessary to protect religious liberty con-
cerns. The following subsections propose two solutions that
would narrow the scope of the ministerial exception with respect
to ADA claims. These solutions generally fall within two broader
approaches. The first solution utilizes analysis that has already
been proffered by certain courts in an attempt to narrow the
ministerial exception as applied to Title VII. In the alternative, a
second solution argues that the ADA is sufficiently distinct from
127 Longo vRegis Jesuit Ligh, 2006 WL 197336, *4-5 (D Colo).
128 2006 WL 197336.
129 Id at *6.
130 597 F3d 769 (6th Cir 2010), cert granted 131 S Ct 1783 (2011).
131 Id.
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Title VII such that courts should narrow the ministerial excep-
tion to a much greater extent than it has under Title VII.
A. Courts Should Adopt the Ninth's Circuit's Logic in Bollard
and Apply it to ADA Claims by Taking a Categorical Ap-
proach to Disability Discrimination Cases
1. The categorical approach: building on an existing
framework.
Bollard refused to find a Free Exercise rationale for applying
the ministerial exception to Title VII for the instant sexual har-
assment claim. 132 In Bollard, the Jesuits condemned the sexual
harassment at issue under a Title VII claim as not being repre-
sentative of their values or beliefs.13 3 Therefore, the Bollard court
concluded there would be no danger of "thrustling] the secular
courts into the constitutionally untenable position of passing
judgment on questions of religious faith or doctrine."134 Bollard
also made it clear that extending the ministerial exception to bar
a Title VII claim in this context would "stray[ ] too far from the
rationale of the Free Exercise Clause."135 Additionally, Bollard,
again seizing on the fact that the Jesuits disavowed sexual har-
assment as part of their doctrine, found that there was a very
low chance of excessive government entanglement in church af-
fairs or decision-making.136 Instead, allowing the matter to be
heard by a jury would involve a secular inquiry into whether the
employer took steps to prevent the harassment, as well as the
extent of the harassment itself.137 As noted in the previous sec-
tion, lower courts outside of the Ninth Circuit-such as the dis-
trict court in Dolquist-have also adopted this approach to sexu-
al harassment claims on the grounds that sexual harassment
cannot be justified by church doctrine. 13 8
This Comment argues that courts, when entertaining disa-
bility discrimination claims under the ADA, should adopt a cate-
gory-based or so-called "categorical approach." This approach
would work to substantially narrow the ministerial exception. To
accomplish this, courts should apply the same logic to the catego-
132 Bollard, 196 F3d at 948.
133 Id.
134 Id at 947.
135 Id.
136 Bollard, 196 F3d at 950.
137 See id.
138 See Dolquist, 342 F Supp 2d at 1004.
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ry of disability discrimination claims that courts-most notably
in Bollard-have seemingly applied to sexual harassment claims.
Bollard indicates that not all categories of claims would be treat-
ed with the same degree of deference to the ministerial excep-
tion.13 9 Therefore, the courts should harness the Bollard reason-
ing-a lack of doctrinal basis for the discrimination-and apply
it to ADA claims. Disability discrimination claims, like sexual
harassment claims, are far enough outside the scope of the
church-minister relationship that these claims should be consid-
ered to be a second carved-out exception to the broader applica-
tion of the ministerial exception. As discussed in more detail be-
low, this framework builds upon an approach already taken in
the literaturel 40 but stops short of applying this framework to all
employment discrimination claims.
As decisions such as Bollard, Dolquist, and McKelvey v
Piercel41 point out, allowing such claims to proceed does not in-
trude upon religious autonomy or a court's evaluation of the mer-
its of a given religious doctrine. Instead, the court's inquiry
would not involve a greater intrusion on religious autonomy than
another other type of civil lawsuit (tort claims, etc) against a
church. 1 42
In Elvg, even while upholding the ministerial exception
with respect to a church's dismissal of the employee,143 the Ninth
Circuit explained that, if the church had argued that sexual har-
assment was part of its doctrinal structure, the ministerial ex-
ception would be permitted.144 Therefore, courts should require
the organization seeking dismissal of a disability discrimination
claim on ministerial exception grounds to argue that the alleged
discrimination is in fact part of church teaching; this approach
13 See Vartanian, Note, 40 U Toledo L Rev at 1064 (cited in note 7).
140 See Coon, Note, 54 Vand L Rev at 540-41 (cited in note 12).
141 800 A2d 840 (NJ 2002).
142 Bollard, 196 F3d at 950. The question of general church civil liability in a broader
context of First Amendment protections has long troubled the courts. See, for example,
Cassandra Butler, Comment, Church Tort Liability in Spite of First Amendment Protec-
tion, 12 S U L Rev 37 (1986). However, churches are not immune from imposition of tort
liability, for example, on First Amendment grounds. See, for example, Malicki v Doe, 814
S2d 347 (Fla 2002) (noting that, even though the lawsuit may impact religious practice
incidentally, "the parishioners' cause of action for negligent hiring and supervision is not
barred because it is based on neutral applications of tort law"), citing Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye v City of Hialeah, 508 US 520, 531 (1993). Bollard also seems to
imply that any lawsuit will have some sort of incidental impact on church functioning.
However, such incidental impact need not bar the progress of the lawsuit. Bollard, 196
F3d at 950.
143 Elvig, 375 F3d at 969.
144 Id at 959.
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has been already advocated by one commentator, who argues in
favor of requiring that the sued religious employer assert a doc-
trinal basis in order to invoke the ministerial exception. 14 5 How-
ever, the commentator advocating this approach wishes to apply
it to "all employment discrimination claims in which religious
organizations cannot articulate a religious belief or practice that
would be implicated by the adjudication."146
Instead, this Comment argues that such a framework should
not be applied to all claims of employment discrimination involv-
ing ministers. Additionally, this Comment proposes that courts
should examine employment discrimination claims in different
categories and that courts should not use the ministerial excep-
tion when considering the disability discrimination claim catego-
ry. Blanket application to all employment discrimination claims
would expose churches to unconstitutional government intrusion
and restrict the free exercise of religion. Instead, carving out cat-
egories that rarely implicate religious beliefs is not only more
attuned to religious freedom concerns, but also presents a more
realistic option for courts to implement. The ministerial excep-
tion enjoys at least some degree of vitality within the majority of
circuits. 1 4 7 Courts would likely mount considerable resistance to
the application of this approach to all types of employment dis-
crimination claims. Therefore, it is important to reiterate that
this solution only applies to disability discrimination claims.
Simply put, courts are more likely to narrow the ministerial ex-
ception case by case or category by category than to rethink the
entire doctrine. However, the proposed approach would increase
the likelihood that courts would carve out another category in
which the ministerial exception is not applied as vigorously. The
145 Coon, Note, 54 Vand L Rev at 540-41 (cited in note 12). The Note outlined a test in
which "the church defendant would carry the burden of asserting a religious reason for its
employment decision or a religious doctrine that would otherwise be implicated if the
court were to adjudicate the claim." The commentator illustrated,
"[Ilf a female plaintiff alleged sex discrimination against a church, the church
would have to respond that it did not believe in hiring women for the position at
issue for religious reasons. Meeting this burden would essentially constitute an
affirmative defense for the defendant, and the ministerial exception would be
applied to preclude the plaintiff's case. Religious reasons for employment deci-
sions would be construed broadly, so the court would not substantially assert it-
self into a determination of which types of beliefs or practices could constitute a
doctrinal motivation for the employment action at issue."
146 Id at 544.
147 See Cole, 4 Charleston L Rev at 707 (noting that, "[iun the last three decades, every
circuit except the Federal Circuit has adopted the ministerial exception in some form")
(cited in note 8).
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proffered approach narrows the overall scope of the ministerial
exception slightly and more gradually.
The proposed test advocated in this Comment requires that,
when an ADA claim comes before the court, the presumption is
that disability discrimination is not included within the organi-
zation's religious doctrine. To invoke the ministerial exception,
the organization must then simply assert that the discrimination
has a religious basis. 148 This framework does not require that
courts delve into any sort of religious inquiry;149 it Simply asks
the church to assert whether this form of discrimination is in fact
part of the accepted religious tenets of the religious organization
if the organization wishes to assert the ministerial exception. 150
As pleadings are public, many religious organizations would be
deterred from making such an argument if for no other reason
than public embarrassment, assuming that the discrimination is
not known by the public to constitute a part of church doctrine.
Such a solution would have the practical effect of reducing the
expansion of the ministerial exception into the realm of disability
discrimination claims, 15 1 allowing such claims to be addressed on
the merits. It would also have the added benefit of saving courts
the administrative costs (at least with respect to disability dis-
crimination claims) of determining whether a given job is "minis-
terial" in nature, which can be a factually-intensive, difficult in-
quiry. This solution strikes the balance of protecting the inter-
ests of the employees of religious organizations while at the same
time respecting the free exercise rights of any religious organiza-
tion that wishes to discriminate against the disabled.
Critics of this solution will most assuredly point to the Ninth
Circuit's failure to extend Bollard to accommodate the ADA
claim made in Werft. This Comment argues that the Ninth Cir-
cuit incorrectly applied the Bollard standard within the disabil-
ity context and should view ADA claims within the context of the
categorical approach. Werft refused to extend Bollard because
allowing a disability discrimination claim to proceed would force
a religious organization to present a religious justification for its
employment decisions, and the Ninth Circuit worried that this
would offend the First Amendment. 152 However, the solution
proposed here does not do this. Instead, this solution simply re-
148 See id at 540.
149 Id.
1so See Coon, Note, 54 Vand L Rev at 540 (cited in note 12).
151 See id at 541.
152 See Werft, 377 F3d at 1103-04.
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quires that the religious organization affirmatively assert that
the alleged disability discrimination is in fact a part of church
teaching. It does not require a "religious justification," per se, but
a mere acknowledgement by the defendant that disability dis-
crimination is in fact a part of church doctrine. 15 3 Such a solution
would not require that a religious organization defend its deci-
sion by referencing specific tenets or doctrine, which appears to
be at the heart of the First Amendment justification for the min-
isterial exception.
It is also worth noting that the failure to extend Bollard ap-
pears internally inconsistent. Werft distinguishes Bollard by
stating that sexual harassment goes far beyond the church-
minister relationship, while the decision whether or not to ac-
commodate a disability lies within that relationship. To demon-
strate this, Wert quotes language arguing that the "broader re-
lationship" between a church and its ministers to which the min-
isterial exception applies includes "[m]atters touching this rela-
tionship."154 It is difficult to understand why a religious order
regarding sexual harassment within its ranks also "touches" that
relationship, particularly given Werft's broad reading of that
relationship. Therefore, it seems that the Ninth Circuit is unsure
of what the appropriate boundaries are with respect to what is
within and what is beyond the scope of the church-minister rela-
tionship. The proposed solution in this Comment approaches this
question from a different angle-not by attempting to define the
exact contours of the church-minister relationship, but by in-
stead ensuring that judicial review of alleged employment dis-
crimination by a church does not devolve into courts assessing
the validity of church doctrine.
2. This solution extends the reasoning existing within cur-
rent Second Circuit case law.
The proffered approach goes beyond the "nature of the
claim" prong adopted by the Second Circuit initially in Cote.
Some commentators advocate the adoption of the "nature of the
claim" test by all circuits. 155 In Cote, the Second Circuit analyzed
the case by looking at the specific facts of the case, but refused to
examine the genuineness of the church's reasons for dismissing a
153 See Coon, Note, 54 Vand L Rev at 540-41 (cited in note 12).
154 Werft, 377 F3d at 1103, quoting McClure, 460 F2d at 559.
155 See, for example, Vartanian, Note, 40 U Toledo L Rev at 1069-74 (cited in note 7).
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priest. 15 6 In Redhead, this approach was interpreted by a lower
court to require a determination of "whether the nature of the
dispute in this case is such that its resolution inevitably will run
afoul of the Establishment Clause." 57 While such an approach
does demand a closer examination of the facts of a given case and
has been viewed by subsequent courts as providing more judicial
leeway to examine the asserted reasons for dismissal, 158 ulti-
mately the result does not adequately protect church employees
from the ministerial exception. The solution, therefore, is to ap-
proach claims made under the ADA with a categorical approach.
However, courts taking this approach must be cognizant of both
Free Exercise and Establishment Clause concerns.
3. This solution narrows the ministerial exception for one
group of employees while still maintaining respect for
church autonomy.
Such concerns about the integrity of church autonomy in in-
ternal decision-making are valid. To proponents of the ministeri-
al exception, it is the plaintiffs role within the spiritual life of
the church that determines whether he or she is subject to the
ministerial exception. Ruling otherwise or changing the manner
in which courts approach this issue will unconstitutionally inter-
fere with the hiring and firing decisions of churches. A categori-
cal approach would involve an impermissible examination of
church doctrine-precisely the kind of judicial interference that
the ministerial exception was created to prevent. Ultimately,
however, this solution provides churches with the opportunity to
maintain their autonomy.
First, churches wishing to assert the ministerial exception
would be free to assert that a particular form of disability dis-
crimination-such as the failure to provide reasonable accommo-
dation-is in fact a part of religious doctrine or practice. For ex-
ample, if the Catholic Church avers that a priest must be able to
stand in order to conduct Mass effectively, the church may assert
the ministerial exception to defend against a disability discrimi-
nation suit. It is important to reiterate that this approach does
not require a court to assess the validity of the doctrine or prac-
156 Cote, 520 F3d at 209-10.
157 Redhead, 566 F Supp 2d at 132.
158 See, for example, Rojas v Roman Catholic Diocese ofRochester, 557 F Supp 2d 387,
398-99 (WDNY 2008) (noting that Cote appears to reject the argument that "a court may
never inquire into a church's stated reasons for terminating a minister").
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tice presented as the justification for discriminating against a
disabled employee. That type of judicial inquiry would be consti-
tutionally impermissible, as the Supreme Court has expressly
condemned courts "put[ting] to the proof" any sect's "religious
doctrines or beliefs."159 Therefore, if the church argues that the
discriminatory conduct with respect to a disabled employee was
doctrinally based, the exception can be asserted. This doctrine
functions on the assumption that churches would not wish to
embrace as part of doctrine things that would reflect poorly upon
the religious organization and its tenets as a whole. Arguably,
this would make discrimination against the disabled based on
pure animus toward the disabled less likely to occur. This refusal
to embrace nefarious conduct is what occurred in Bollard, as the
Jesuit Order refused to acknowledge that the ongoing sexual
harassment at issue had a doctrinal basis.160
Certainly, concern over any potential chilling effect on
church personnel decisions that such an approach would create
within churches is valid. The aim of this solution is to lessen the
occurrence of unwarranted discrimination, not to provide the
government with veto authority over church administration. In
this spirit, the proposed solution has been structured to minimize
any resulting chilling effect in two respects. First, while not le-
gally required to provide an explanation of the doctrinal reasons
for a disabled employee's dismissal, the religious entity is cer-
tainly free to do so. The church can avail itself of court filings or
any other public forums (including the church itself) to defend or
justify its position. Whether the church is embarrassed by its
position regarding a given discrimination claim is a separate in-
quiry from whether it is legally permitted to assert the ministe-
rial exception. While churches enjoy the constitutional right to
exercise their faiths free of government intrusion, the Constitu-
tion does not afford the same protection from the scrutiny and
accompanying praise or opprobrium of the public. Second, the
proposed solution's gradualist approach is sensitive to concerns
of chilling church behavior regarding hiring practices. By nar-
rowing the ministerial exception with respect to a single category
that-much like sexual harassment-appears to be largely un-
connected to religious doctrine, the solution puts churches on
notice with respect to antidiscrimination laws while leaving most
of the existing ministerial exception framework intact.
159 UnitedStates vBalard, 322 US 78, 86 (1944).
160 Bollard, 196 F3d at 947.
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Second, courts have already adopted this categorical ap-
proach with respect to sexual harassment claims, and the gen-
eral ministerial exception remains intact. Cases such as Bollard
and Dolquist provide support for this approach to discrimination
claims. This solution simply targets another category of discrim-
ination claims-namely, those based on disability status-that is
less likely to be a part of church doctrine.
Third, while this approach narrows the ministerial excep-
tion, its overall impact will be limited to claims of disability dis-
crimination. The solution is actually quite moderate, as the ap-
proach is simply a scaling-down of a broader doctrine that has
gone far beyond its original statutory origins. Additionally,
churches would still be free to assert the ministerial exception.
However, by compelling churches to proffer a reason for the al-
leged discrimination on the basis of disability status, the goal of
this solution is to move beyond a jurisprudence in which courts
simply rely on the procedural bar without hearing these claims
on the merits. With all of this said, even if courts adopt this
framework, the ministerial exception would be largely un-
changed, as other categories of discrimination claims would still
be subject to the current ministerial exception as applied. This
proposal simply seeks to narrow the ministerial exception, not
abolish it entirely. By leaving the exception largely intact, the
fears of excessive government interference with church operation
or a hindrance of religious exercise would arguably be overstat-
ed.
B. In the Alternative, Claims Brought under the ADA Should
be Analyzed Distinctly from Title VII Claims
As an alternative to the first approach, this Comment also
argues that ADA claims should be analyzed distinctly from Title
VII claims, a departure from the current practice. The following
Section outlines the rationale as to why claims brought under the
ADA should not be bound by previous Title VII analysis with re-
spect to the ministerial exception.
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1. The ADA possesses a reasonable-accommodations mech-
anism that is sufficient to address First Amendment
concerns.
The ADA forbids employment discrimination on the basis of
disability.16' The statute defines discrimination, in part, as "not
making reasonable accommodation to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered
entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered
entity."162 It is a defense under the statute that a reasonable ac-
commodation could not be made for the disabled employee.163 A
reasonable accommodation does not need to be made under the
ADA if the accommodation would impose an undue hardship,
which the statute defines as "an action requiring significant dif-
ficulty or expense." 164 The ADA lists a series of factors that can
be considered so as to determine whether an accommodation con-
stitutes an "undue hardship," including nature and cost, 165 finan-
cial ability of the employer to provide such accommodations,16 6
and, most importantly, the "type of operation or operations of the
covered entity, including the composition, structure, and func-
tions of the workplace of such entity."167
By considering the "type of operation" of the religious organ-
ization, the inherent religious nature of the organization will be
a factor in the analysis. Courts therefore would be able to focus
the inquiry on whether the accommodation itself is a reasonable
one. In this context, an accommodation that would interfere with
the spiritual mission of the church would inherently be unrea-
sonable. The ADA even provides further protections for churches
161 42 USC § 12122(a) ("No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified indi-
vidual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, ad-
vancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.").
162 42 USC § 12122(b).
163 42 USC § 12113(a) ("It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this
chapter that an alleged application of qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria
that screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual
with a disability has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity,
and such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation, as required
under this subchapter.") (emphasis added).
164 42 USC § 12111(10)(A).
165 42 USC § 12111(10)(B)(i).
166 42 USC § 12111(10)(B)(iii).
167 42 USC § 12111(10)(B)(iv).
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in that it also includes an exception for financial burdens. There-
fore, this mechanism lessens the likelihood that the government
would be able to require churches to make accommodations to
the point at which they are diverting excessive financial re-
sources away from their central spiritual function.
2. Using the ADA analysis simplifies the process for courts
by avoiding the intrusive and factually messy determi-
nation of what positions qualify as "ministerial posi-
tions."
By analyzing disability discrimination claims against
churches using an ADA reasonable accommodations standard-
as opposed to mirroring a traditional Title VII analysis-courts
can narrow the ministerial exception and spare the court a ra-
ther exhaustive inquiry. In using the ADA, courts need not spend
time asking whether a church's decision to provide reasonable
accommodations impermissively delves into the church-minister
relationship. The Elvig court noted that determining whether
sexual harassment had in fact occurred would be a secular in-
quiry.168 Therefore, it seems as though the decision of whether to
provide an employee with reasonable accommodations also has
very little, if anything, to do with the practice of religious doc-
trine itself. The requirement of a "reasonable" accommodation
can be analyzed as a secular inquiry without getting into the
merits of a given religious tenet. Doing so would allow the courts
to examine disability claims in churches in a manner similar to
those of other civil rights claims. In determining the reasonable-
ness of the requested accommodation, the ADA provides for a
totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry-such that the reviewing
court would determine whether the imposition of the accommo-
dation would either constitute an excessive government entan-
glement in church decisions or would interfere with the exercise
of religion. However, this inquiry is not as rigid as the ministeri-
al exception framework analyzed within the Title VII context. In
a sense, the ADA provides courts seeking to narrow the ministe-
rial exception with an "out" with respect to disability discrimina-
tion claims. Despite constituting a distinct line of analysis, utiliz-
ing the ADA instead of Title VII arguably harnesses the spirit of
the Cote/Redhead cases by moving toward a more "nature of the
168 Elvig, 375 F3d at 958-64.
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claim" analysis, as opposed to making a determination about the
ministerial role of the plaintiff.
3. This approach provides courts a way to narrow the min-
isterial exception for this area of law without impacting
the Title VII doctrine.
Opponents of this approach will argue that it has no ground-
ing in precedent, since ADA claims have been incorporated into
the Title VII analysis. However, this solution allows courts to
remove an entire class of discrimination claims from the ministe-
rial exception's Title VII analysis without disturbing the Title
VII framework. Instead, disability discrimination claims against
churches will be analyzed under the ADA "reasonable accommo-
dation" doctrine. By creating a parallel framework, the existing
Title VII doctrine will not be further narrowed beyond what it
has been by decisions such as Bollard, Elvig, Cote, and Redhead.
While finding a way to narrow or weaken the ministerial excep-
tion within the established Title VII jurisprudence has occupied
commentators for decades, this solution provides a new path for
the courts with respect to an entire class of discrimination
claims. Therefore, if the courts seek to narrow the ministerial
exception outside of the Title VII context, this is a means to do
SO.
III. CONCLUSION
The ministerial exception has, through judicial intervention, ex-
panded far beyond the intended parameters of ensuring that the
government was not curtailing religious freedom through en-
forcement of secular employment discrimination laws. One way
to narrow the exception is to attack the ministerial exception as
applied to disability discrimination claims. Disability discrimina-
tion, much like sexual harassment, lacks a serious religious doc-
trinal basis. Seizing upon this, courts can choose to analyze disa-
bility claims in the same manner in which sexual harassment
claims have been addressed by some courts. By utilizing the
framework established by Title VII, the courts narrow the minis-
terial exception, while still respecting the free exercise of religion
and acknowledging the wider societal interest in workplaces that
do not discriminate on the basis of disability status. However, if
such an approach does not appear workable to the courts, in the
alternative, the courts should analyze disability discrimination
claims solely within the context of the ADA, as opposed to simply
adopting the Title VII framework for disability claims. Either of
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these solutions attempts to strike a balance between preserving
the autonomy and free exercise of religious organizations while
addressing the problem of workplace discrimination against the
disabled. As noted above, this is just not simply a problem among
pastors. The ministerial exception has been applied widely
throughout our society, from the Salvation Army to parochial
schools and other employees of religious organizations. Such re-
ligious organizations, while serving a higher purpose, must also
be subject to secular antidiscrimination laws. This Comment has
attempted to provide solutions that achieve balance two im-
portant societal interests: religious autonomy and a rejection of
unwarranted discriminatory employment practices.
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